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The continued globalization of world economies and
the related developments in information and communi-
cations technologies have brought into sharper focus the
question whether maintaining the existing international
tax principles provides an effective way of taxing inter-
national transactions. Since most countries assert their
jurisdiction to tax based on the dual taxing principles of
residence and source,1 it is likely that attempts to resolve
any problems will be made in the context of these princi-
ples. While traditionally most countries define their
jurisdiction to tax by reference to both of these princi-
ples, this article explores whether, in an increasingly
globalized world, it is more appropriate that one princi-
ple yield completely to the other.2 That is, this article
explores whether either an exclusive residence-based tax
system or an exclusive source-based tax system would
provide a viable (and perhaps simpler) solution to
accommodate international transactions, many of
which now occur electronically.
2. Exclusive Residence-Based Taxation
2.1. Introductory remarks
The anticipated difficulties with continuing to apply
source-based tax principles (including the permanent
establishment concept) in an electronic commerce set-
ting3 raise the question whether these difficulties can be
overcome by adopting an exclusive residence-based tax
system. Under such a system, source countries would not
have jurisdiction to tax electronic commerce transac-
tions, which would be taxed exclusively in the countries
where the enterprises conducting the business are con-
sidered to be resident. While such an approach may, at
first glance, appear to be too arbitrary and one-sided in
favour of residence countries, many believe that, unless
electronic commerce transactions are taxed in the coun-
try where the enterprises engaging in the transactions
are resident, the transactions may escape taxation alto-
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1. Under these principles, residents are generally taxed on their worldwide
income (residence principle) and non-residents only on their domestic-
source income (source principle); see e.g. Woellner, Robin et al., Australian
Taxation Law (2001), at 1343.
2. It is recognized that already under the existing international tax rules, in
order to avoid double taxation one principle must necessarily yield to the
other. This occurs in a number of ways through tax treaties, where countries
restrict their source-based taxing rights with respect to non-resident taxpay-
ers in order to exercise their residence-based taxing rights. For example, the
permanent establishment concept represents a preference for residence-based
taxation by establishing a threshold for source-based taxation of business
profits. However, unlike the current international tax regime, where one prin-
ciple yields to the other in some situations, this article is concerned with
whether either residence or source-based taxation yielding completely to the
other provides a viable solution in an increasingly globalized world to accom-
modate electronic commerce transactions.
3. These difficulties include the problem of determining a physical pres-
ence in the source country as well as the increased mobility of enterprises,
making it more difficult to link items of income with specific geographical
locations.
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gether.4 The US Treasury has been a prominent advocate
of residence-based taxation and has at different times
indicated its preference for such a system. In 1996, and
relevantly in the context of electronic commerce, the US
Treasury hinted at the possible ascendancy of residence-
based taxation in the face of emerging technologies:
The growth of new communications technologies and elec-
tronic commerce will likely require that principles of residence-
based taxation assume even greater importance. In the world of
cyberspace, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to apply tradi-
tional source concepts to link an item of income with a specific
geographical location. Therefore, source-based taxation could
lose its rationale and be rendered obsolete by electronic com-
merce. By contrast, almost all taxpayers are resident some-
where.5
The US Treasury has also contended that the move
towards residence-based taxation represents a continua-
tion of an apparent trend (at least in US tax policy) to
replace source-based taxation with residence-based tax-
ation when the source principles come under pressure
and lose their significance.6 According to the US Treas-
ury, this trend will be accelerated by developments in
electronic commerce.7 To others, however, the trend
towards residence-based taxation may not be self-evi-
dent, and it is contended that the difficulty (perceived or
actual) in applying source-based tax principles to elec-
tronic commerce transactions does not by itself support
the international adoption of an exclusive residence-
based tax system.8 Rather, if an exclusive residence-
based tax system is to be adopted, its potential impact
needs to be critically examined in light of accepted tax
policy principles to ascertain whether it can provide a
more feasible and viable alternative to the current
arrangements. This analysis is undertaken below.
2.2. Implementation
In examining the feasibility of an exclusive residence-
based tax system, consideration must first be given to
how it could be implemented. To be effective, such a sys-
tem would need to be adopted on an international basis,
and this is arguably best achieved in conjunction with
the extensive tax treaty network that presently exists. In
this way, the income from electronic commerce activi-
ties could be carved out from Arts. 5 and 7 of the OECD
Model Tax Convention, and the right to tax such income
could then be allocated to countries in which the enter-
prises conducting such activities are resident.
Such an approach could be implemented in three alter-
nate ways. First, the business profits rule in Art. 7 of the
OECD Model could be modified to specify that the
income from electronic commerce transactions may be
taxed only in the country in which the enterprise is resi-
dent. Alternatively, an exclusive residence-based tax sys-
tem could be implemented by including electronic com-
merce transactions in the “negative list” in Art. 5(4) of the
OECD Model, thereby excluding such transactions from
the definition of permanent establishment. Finally, a
separate article could be included in the OECD Model
dealing specifically with the profits arising from elec-
tronic commerce transactions which allocates such
profits exclusively to the residence country. Such an arti-
cle could be modelled on Art. 8 of the OECD Model,
which deals with shipping and air transport profits. Art.
8 allocates such profits to the country of the effective
management of the enterprise. Similarly, a new provi-
sion for electronic commerce transactions could allocate
the profits arising from them to the place of effective
management of the enterprise generating the profits.
Of these three alternatives, it is suggested that the last
one may be the most workable since it would deal sepa-
rately with electronic commerce transactions and there-
fore avoid any ambiguity of the alternative approaches.
This alternative would also treat electronic commerce
transactions consistently with how other activities that
are taxed on a residence-basis are treated under the
OECD Model.9 Finally, credible analogies between elec-
tronic commerce transactions and air or shipping profits
may be drawn, which provide further support for
including a separate article, similar to Art. 8 of the
OECD Model, to deal with electronic commerce trans-
actions. These analogies are analysed in the next section.
4. In many respects, the debate of residence versus source-based taxation
precedes the current debate in the context of electronic commerce transac-
tions. The present international tax system, under which business profits are
taxed only in the source country if a permanent establishment exists, repre-
sents in many ways a balance or compromise between the two systems, despite
recommendations by commentators at various times that tax systems adopt
either the residence principle or the source principle exclusively.
5. US Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Policy, Selected Tax Policy
Implications of Global Electronic Commerce (1996), at [7.1.5]; available at
www.ustreas.gov/taxpolicy/internet.html (hereafter “US Treasury Report”).
6. The US Treasury Report, id. at [7.1.5], giving the examples of adopting
residence-based rules for sales of non-inventory property and similar rules
for space and ocean activities in support of the US Treasury’s assertion,
adding that “[i]n situations where traditional source concepts have already
been rendered too difficult to apply effectively, the residence of the taxpayer
has been the most likely means to identify the jurisdiction where the eco-
nomic activities that created the income took place, and thus the jurisdiction
that should have the primary right to tax such income”. Earlier examples of the
US Treasury’s preference for a residence-based tax system can also be found in
the literature; see e.g. Bradford, David and the US Treasury Tax Policy Staff,
Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform (1977), at 89, advocating that the United States
seek, as a long-term objective, a worldwide system of residence-based taxa-
tion; and US Treasury, The President’s Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness,
Growth and Simplicity (1985), at 383.
7. The US Treasury’s analysis in this respect may, however, be challenged as
the examples used to support its assertion (sales of non-inventory property
and space and ocean activities) are arguably a misleading parallel to electronic
commerce transactions. See e.g. Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “International Taxation
of Electronic Commerce” 52 Tax Law Review 507 (1997), at 526: “[T]he source
rule for sales of non-inventory property has always favoured residence-based
taxation because of the difficulty of establishing basis for nonresident taxpay-
ers. The space and ocean activity rules reflect a sense that the income truly has
no source in the sense of being earned outside all taxing jurisdictions.” By con-
trast, electronic commerce transactions arguably have a source in a conven-
tional sense as the production and consumption activities take place in phys-
ical locations – though determining these locations and linking items of
income to them may be difficult issues, thereby making the application of the
traditional source rules to electronic commerce transactions more problem-
atic than in a traditional context.
8. Sweet, John K., “Formulating International Tax Laws in the Age of Elec-
tronic Commerce: The Possible Ascendancy of Residence-Based Taxation in
an Era of Eroding Traditional Income Tax Principles”, 146 University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review 1949 (1998), at 1991, observing that “[t]he adoption of a
tax system solely by default cannot be defended as good policy”.
9. Including, in this context, Art. 8 (Shipping, inland waterways transport
and air transport) and Art. 17 (Artistes and sportsmen) of the OECD Model.
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2.3. An analogous provision – Art. 8 of the OECD
Model and the avoidance of double taxation
There is a long history of shipping profits being exempt
from source-country taxation,10 and a more recent his-
tory of air navigation profits being similarly exempt.11
Both of these exemptions are now in Art. 8 of the OECD
Model, which allocates exclusive taxing rights with
respect to shipping and air transport profits to the coun-
try in which the enterprise’s place of effective manage-
ment is situated.
This rule recognizes that, given the itinerant nature of
shipping and air transport, it is likely that such profits
could be subject to tax in more than one country in the
absence of a bright-line rule which allocates the right to
tax such profits to either the source or residence coun-
try.12 Moreover, international shipping and air transport
operations are typically spread out over many countries
in which permanent establishments may be established
to accommodate the various aspects of the operations.
In this context, Prof. Klaus Vogel noted that taxation
under the permanent establishment principle would
result in the problem of how to attribute a proper share
of the enterprise’s profits to each of its permanent estab-
lishments.13 To overcome these problems, Art. 8 of the
OECD Model allocates exclusive taxation of shipping
and air transport profits to the country in which the
enterprise’s effective management is located and
exempts such profits from tax in the countries in which
the activities take place, even if a permanent establish-
ment is maintained in those countries.
Like shipping and air transport activities, electronic
commerce operations may be conducted in many coun-
tries and could therefore give rise to the same concerns
regarding multiple taxation that led to the adoption of
Art. 8 of the OECD Model. Because conflicting claims
may give rise to double taxation, a rule similar to Art. 8
could be introduced which allocates exclusive taxing
rights with respect to the income from electronic com-
merce transactions to the residence country. Such an
allocation of taxing rights would avoid the potential for
multiple claims to tax the same income, and the likeli-
hood of double taxation would thus be greatly
reduced.14
Therefore, one of the major reasons for (and advantages
of ) implementing an exclusive residence-based tax sys-
tem is that it would assist in avoiding double taxation
that could arise from multiple claims to tax the income
from electronic commerce transactions. This article next
examines the other advantages that may be associated
with an exclusive residence-based tax system for elec-
tronic commerce transactions and then analyses the dis-
advantages of such an approach.
2.4. Advantages of an exclusive residence-based tax
system
2.4.1. Permanent establishment standard may be
disregarded
If an exclusive residence-based tax system were adopted
for electronic commerce transactions, the tax authorities
would not need to determine whether a permanent
establishment existed in the source country for the
income arising from those transactions because a resi-
dence-based system allocates the taxing rights with
respect to such income on the basis of the residence of
enterprises rather than where the activities take place
(i.e. source country).15 By exempting such income from
taxation in the source country, the need to determine the
existence of a permanent establishment is removed with
respect to electronic commerce transactions. This would
be a desirable outcome as it avoids the difficult issue of
determining whether a permanent establishment exists,
and if so where, for electronic commerce transactions.16
2.4.2. Certainty and simplicity
Determining residence (at least for individuals) is rela-
tively easy and may be done according to bright-line
rules17 because an individual can only be in one place at
10. Seligman, Edwin R., Double Taxation and International Fiscal Coopera-
tion (1928), at 52, noting that the profits of foreign ships were exempt from
source-country taxation in the Netherlands as early as 1819, and observing
that shipping profits were exempt from source-country taxation under the
first shipping treaty between France and Belgium in 1843; both cited in
Doernberg, Richard and Luc Hinnekens, Electronic Commerce and Interna-
tional Taxation (1999), at 303. 
11. Doernberg and Hinnekens, id. at 304, noting that the League of Nations
added air navigation in 1928 to shipping among its list of activities that should
be subject to exclusive residence-country taxation. See also Hund, D., “The
Development of Double Taxation Conventions with Particular Reference to
Taxation of International Air Transport”, 36 Bulletin for International Fiscal
Documentation 3 (1982), at 111; and Lang, D., “Taxation of International Avia-
tion: A Canadian Perspective”, 40 Canadian Tax Journal 881 (1992).
12. Doernberg and Hinnekens, supra note 10, at 304: “Article 8, which denies
taxing authority to a source state with respect to shipping or air transport
profits, was born out of a recognition that the peripatetic nature of shipping
and air transport would mean that enterprises conducting such business
might be subject to tax in multiple jurisdictions with the attendant likelihood
of double taxation.”
13. Vogel, Klaus, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (3rd ed., 1997),
at 48. also observing that “[a] further consequence of attributing shares in
profits to the various permanent establishments would be fragmented taxa-
tion”.
14. Apart from the US Treasury advocating an exclusive residence-based
tax system, the literature reveals support from other commentators who also
favoured a move to such a system, many on the basis of concerns that elec-
tronic commerce transactions will be subject to double taxation, which could
be avoided by implementing a pure residence-based system. See e.g. Lejeune,
Ine et al., “Does Cyber-Commerce Necessitate a Revision of International Tax
Concepts?”, 38 European Taxation 2 (1998), at 50 (Part II), 58: “One cannot at
present rule out that, on the basis of sovereignty principles, electronic trans-
actions will be subject to double taxation. The best guarantee in order to avoid
double taxation issues would in any case be to abandon the PE concept in
favour of exclusive residence-based taxation.”
15. As indicated earlier, similar considerations led to the adoption of Art. 8
of the OECD Model, which has a residence-based rule for shipping and air
transport profits.
16. These difficulties are beyond the scope of this article and are not
detailed here.
17. Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “The Structure of International Taxation: 
A Proposal for Simplification”, 74 Texas Law Review 1301 (1996), at 1311,
referring to US Internal Revenue Code Sec. 7701(b)(3)(A) as an example of a
bright-line rule for determining residence, and noting that this rule utilizes a 
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a given time. But determining corporate residence is not
always easy, and countries may use different approaches
to determine it. For example, some countries define cor-
porate residence according to the country of incorpora-
tion (e.g. the United States), while other countries define
corporate residence according to other tests (e.g. place of
central management and control).18 Further, as multina-
tional enterprises (MNEs) operate in many places at a
given time, determining the residence of a particular
corporation at a particular time becomes difficult.19
Nevertheless, it is arguable that determining the resi-
dence of individuals and corporations in an electronic
commerce setting is an easier task than the alternative of
determining the source of income in electronic com-
merce.20 This would therefore support residence-based
taxation over source-based taxation, at least in the con-
text of electronic commerce.
2.4.3. Ability to pay and progressivity
Prof. Robert Green has argued that source-based taxa-
tion is incompatible with the ability to pay principle,21
which “is best measured by total income, comprehen-
sively defined and determined without regard to
source”.22 Progressivity assumes that “ability to pay” rises
more than proportionally with income.23
Because source-based taxation does not apply to a tax-
payer’s worldwide income, it can be argued such taxation
is inconsistent with the ability to pay principle. It can
also be argued that the progressivity principle is
breached because taxes levied by source countries are
not based on total income. In addition, in many cases,
source-country taxes are levied on a gross basis, which
can be distorting.24
It can therefore be argued that the ability to pay principle
is better served by residence-based taxation because it
takes into account the taxpayer’s worldwide income,
thereby better reflecting the taxpayer’s global ability to
pay.25 And although not all residence-based tax systems
necessarily have progressive rates, they are considered
less distorting than source-based approaches, especially
where source countries levy tax on a gross basis.
2.4.4. Efficiency and capital-export neutrality
Prof. Richard Musgrave has been credited as being the
first to distinguish between capital-export neutrality
and capital-import neutrality.26 According to his defini-
tion, “export neutrality means that the investor should
pay the same total (domestic plus foreign) tax, whether
he receives a given investment income from foreign or
from domestic sources .... Import neutrality means that
capital funds originating in various countries should
compete at equal terms in the capital market of any
country”.27 Prof. Vogel observed that export neutrality
consequently implies a system of worldwide taxation
with a foreign tax credit, while import neutrality implies
a system of exemption, that is, of source-based taxa-
tion.28
The issue then becomes whether capital-export 
neutrality is to be preferred over capital-import neutral-
ity. The literature generally shows a preference for 
capital-export neutrality.29 If this preference is main-
“substantial presence test” by counting the number of days an individual is
present in the United States. Other jurisdictions have similar rules; see e.g. the
183-day rule for individuals in Australia’s residence rules in the definition of
“resident” in Sec. 6(a) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). In this
respect, the US Treasury, supra note 5, at [7.1.5], observed that “[a]n individual
is almost always a ... resident of a given country and, at least under U.S. law, all
corporations must be established under the laws of a given jurisdiction”.
18. Mitchell, Richard, “United States–Brazil Bilateral Income Tax Treaty
Negotiations”, 21 Hastings International & Comparative Law Review 209
(1997), explaining how the adoption of different residence tests can lead to
residence/residence double taxation.
19. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 17, at 1313, arguing that residence-based tax-
ation should not be used in the case of MNEs because of the difficulty in
determining their residence and the complex task of imputing earnings to
shareholders.
20. See e.g. Ault, Hugh J. and David F. Bradford, “Taxing International
Income: An Analysis of the US System and its Economic Premises”, in Razin,
Assaf and Joel Slemrod (eds.), Taxation in the Global Economy (1990), at 30-31,
referring to and describing the difficulties of identifying a geographical
source of income. It is expected that the problems of determining the source
of income will be exacerbated by electronic commerce, partly due to the
increased mobility that electronic commerce offers, combined with the diffi-
culties of linking items of income with specific jurisdictions.
21. See Green, Robert A., “The Future of Source-Based Taxation of Income
of Multinational Enterprises”, 79 Cornell Law Review 18 (1993), at 29, arguing
that source-based taxation fails the ability to pay principle.
22. Id., citing Pechman, Joseph A., “The Future of the Income Tax”, 80 Amer-
ican Economic Review 1 (1990), at 6. Against this, it could be argued that failing
to comply with the ability to pay principle should not, of itself, mean that the
residence country should have sole taxing rights. In this respect, Prof. Avi-
Yonah has argued that if one looks to economic allegiance, taxes should be
owed to both residence and source countries; Avi-Yonah, supra note 17, at
1311, also citing Tillinghast, David R., International Aspects of International
Transactions (1984), observing that the tax jurisdiction of residence and
source countries rests on the economic benefits conferred on the taxpayer by
both governments.
23. Green, supra note 21, at 29.
24. See e.g. OECD, Electronic Commerce: The Challenges to Tax Authorities
and Taxpayers (1997), available at www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/ec/act/
turkudoc.htm (hereafter “OECD Turku Discussion Document”), at [92]: “Cur-
tailing of source jurisdiction rather than residence jurisdiction ... makes sense
because of the distorting effects of gross basis taxes at source (e.g. withholding
taxes) and the greater ease of enforcing net taxation by assessment in resi-
dence countries.” See also Wiedow, A., “To Withhold or Not to Withhold”, 34
European Taxation 9 (1994), at 293, 294, cited in Doernberg and Hinnekens,
supra note 10, at 305: “[T]his sharing of taxation rights [between source and
residence countries] is out of date in a worldwide, ‘global’ economy and this is
reflected in the general tendency towards a reduction of withholding taxes
between industrialized countries.”
25. For a contrary position, see Kaufman, Nancy H., “Fairness and the Taxa-
tion of International Income”, 29 Law & Policy of International Business 145
(1998), at 155, querying whether a worldwide tax base is necessary for pur-
poses of the ability to pay principle.
26. Vogel, Klaus, “Worldwide vs. source taxation of income – A review and
re-evaluation of arguments (Part II)”, Intertax 310 (No. 10, 1988), at 311.
27. Id., citing Musgrave, Richard, “Criteria for Foreign Tax Credit”, in Taxa-
tion and Operations Abroad, Symposium (1960), at 84-85.
28. Id.
29. See e.g. McLure, Jr., Charles E., “Substituting Consumption-Based Direct
Taxation for Income Taxes as the International Norm”, 45 National Tax Journal
145 (1992), at 146-147 and 153 (footnote 13), explaining that capital-export
neutrality is necessary to achieve an efficient allocation of the world’s invest-
ments, while capital-import neutrality is necessary for an efficient allocation
of savings, considered to be a less significant goal; and Vogel, supra note 26,
at 311, observing that Peggy Musgrave argued for giving priority to capital-
export neutrality (over capital-import neutrality): “[I]t is generally correct as
well to conceive of a tax neutrality with respect to all investors of one country,
so that tax considerations will not influence their decisions to invest at home
or abroad. Such capital-export neutrality will ensure that each national supply
of capital available at that tax level will be allocated internationally in its most
efficient manner.” Prof. Vogel also referred to other commentators who sup-
ported this view, including Richard Musgrave and Bernard Snoy, with Snoy
stating that “in a world where capital markets are perfect and where the
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tained,30 it can be argued that capital-export neutrality is
best achieved by a residence-based tax system because it
taxes all investors at their residence-country rate, irre-
spective of where they derived their income. With coun-
tries having different rates of tax, this approach would
thus best serve the goal of capital-export neutrality as
the tax applicable to international income would equal
the tax on domestic income in a capital-exporting coun-
try; therefore, capital-export neutrality would be the
result.
In terms of efficiency, Charles McLure argued that if all
nations implemented a residence-based tax system, this
would lead to the allocation of the world’s capital to its
most productive use.31 Conversely, source-based taxa-
tion, he argued, would lead to an inefficient allocation of
economic resources as it “discourages investment in
high-tax jurisdictions and encourages investment in
low-tax jurisdictions”.32
Finally, capital-export neutrality can be achieved in a
source-based tax system through the use of foreign tax
credits; however, because most countries apply a
restricted tax credit system,33 as a practical matter, capi-
tal-export neutrality could be achieved only to the
extent the foreign tax rates were lower than the domestic
tax rates.
2.4.5. Political accountability, redistribution of income
and equity considerations
In many cases, the country in which a person is resident
is also where he has his political allegiance. Taxation
based on residence can therefore, in some respects, be
equated to taxation with representation – that is, taxpay-
ers through their elected representatives decide (albeit
indirectly) how much tax they pay.34 In addition, if per-
sonal income taxes are to have a redistributive function
through progressive rates, these considerations are
arguably best accommodated in the residence country
since most individuals generally have only one residence
and are part of one country.35
2.5. Disadvantages of an exclusive residence-based tax
system
2.5.1. Reliance and emphasis on the definition of
residence
Moving to an exclusive residence-based tax system obvi-
ously places a great reliance and emphasis on the defini-
tion of residence. As noted earlier, for individuals, it
should be possible to establish bright-line rules to deter-
mine residence, but to implement a full residence-based
tax system, it is necessary to determine the residence of
corporations.36 The varying definitions used by coun-
tries to determine corporate residence and the difficul-
ties of formulating bright-line rules for determining it
(especially for MNEs) both represent impediments to
adopting an exclusive residence-based tax system in the
corporate context. In addition, the need to secure an
internationally acceptable and applicable definition of
residence that cannot be easily manipulated in an elec-
tronic commerce context represents a further barrier to
adopting a residence-based tax system for electronic
commerce.
As observed earlier, some countries use formalistic rules,
such as the place of incorporation test, to determine cor-
porate residence. Such tests are vulnerable to manipula-
tion in both traditional and electronic commerce envi-
ronments. Even countries that use other tests, such as the
place of central management and control test or the
place of effective management test,37 face challenges in
applying the tests in an electronic commerce setting.
Determining the place of top-level management
becomes problematic in an electronic commerce envi-
ronment, especially in light of more mobile directors
and technologies such as videoconferencing facilities,
which allow for decentralization of the management
functions.
Given these difficulties, a review of the current defini-
tions of residence and tax rules is necessary to determine
whether an internationally acceptable and rigorous test
for residence can be adopted to enable an exclusive resi-
dence-based system to operate effectively.38 If an inter-
financing of corporate investment projects is not subjected to internal funds
constraint, tax neutrality towards capital import is clearly not a prerequisite
for efficient allocation of resources”; id., citing Snoy, Bernard, Taxes on Direct
Investment Income in the EEC, A Legal and Economic Analysis (1975), at 37, and
noting that further support for capital-export neutrality can be found in Sato,
M. and R. Bird, “International Aspects of the Taxation of Corporations and
Shareholders”, 22 IMF Staff Papers 408 (1975): “[O]nly capital-export neutral-
ity accords with the objective of world efficiency.”
30. It has been argued that the debate on capital-export neutrality versus
capital-import neutrality is less significant and relevant in a globalizing econ-
omy; see e.g. Frisch, Daniel J., “The Economics of International Tax Policy:
Some Old and New Approaches”, 47 Tax Notes 581 (1990).
31. McLure, Jr., Charles E., “US Tax Laws and Capital Flight from Latin
America”, 20 University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 321 (1989),
at 325.
32. Id.
33. Many countries, including the United States, operate a restricted foreign
tax credit system – for many reasons, including the concern that granting a
full credit for the taxes paid in other countries may operate as a subsidy
arrangement for one country if the foreign tax rates exceed the domestic tax
rates. Pure capital-export neutrality, however, cannot be achieved under a
restricted foreign tax credit system.
34. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 17, at 1312: “In democratic countries, it is con-
sidered important for individuals to have a right to participate – through their
representatives – in deciding how much tax they have to pay.” Arguably, how-
ever, the converse of this is more significant, i.e. the preference of democratic
legislatures to raise taxes on foreigners because they cannot vote; id.
35. Id., citing Blum, Walter J. and Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Pro-
gressive Taxation (1953) on the importance of distributional concerns in
income taxation. See also Kaplow, Louis and Steven Shavell, “Why the Legal
System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income”, 23
Journal of Legal Studies 667 (1994), at 677, recommending that taxation be
used as a redistributive device in preference to other methods.
36. As an alternative to determining corporate residence, Prof. Green advo-
cated that the earnings of publicly-traded MNEs be imputed to their share-
holders; Green, supra note 21, at 70-74. However, determining the residence
of corporations is more difficult than determining the residence of individu-
als and imputing earnings to shareholders is a difficult task; see e.g. Avi-Yonah,
supra note 7, at 526: “[I]t is not at all clear what residence means in the case of
a multinational, especially now that the shareholder base, sources of capital,
and location of business activities of multinationals may all be dispersed over
many taxing jurisdictions.”
37. See Art. 4(3) of the OECD Model, which uses the place of effective man-
agement as the tie-breaker in cases of dual residence of non-individual tax-
payers.
38. See e.g. US Treasury Report, supra note 5, at [7.1.5], suggesting the 
possible ascendancy of residence-based taxation, but noting that “a review of
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national consensus can be reached on a uniform test for
residence, these impediments can be removed. But if
such a consensus cannot be reached, the likelihood of
moving to an exclusive residence-based system is greatly
diminished.
2.5.2. Revenue-sharing between countries, international
consensus and the risk of double taxation
An exclusive residence-based tax system avoids the
uncertainties of determining where income arises and
the risk of countries taking divergent approaches which
may give rise to double taxation because such a tax sys-
tem minimizes the opportunities for conflicting claims
between residence and source countries. Despite this,
however, an exclusive residence-based system would
represent a fundamental shift in taxing rights, which
may jeopardize the current allocation of tax revenues
and revenue-sharing between source and residence
countries. Many countries would not regard this as an
equitable outcome, and it is therefore unlikely to receive
international support. Further, if such an approach were
adopted, many countries might resort to unilateral
measures to preserve their tax base, which could lead to
double taxation.39
Even in a traditional context, countries face conflicting
objectives in deciding whether to apply residence or
source-based taxation, and there is therefore an inherent
tension between countries that are capital exporters and
those that are capital importers. Capital-exporting
countries tend to prefer a residence-based tax system,
while capital-importing countries tend to focus on
source-country taxation, which reflects their contribu-
tion to the income-generating process in taking capital
and employing it in a productive capacity.40 Under the
current international tax rules, while income is not
shared equally between capital-exporting and capital-
importing countries, the inherent tension between capi-
tal exporters and capital importers is resolved by apply-
ing the residence and source principles as well as tax
treaty concepts, such as the permanent establishment
threshold. The application of these rules represents a
compromise between competing interests and achieves
a sharing of tax revenues between capital-exporting and
capital-importing countries.
An exclusive residence-based tax system would invari-
ably favour countries that are net exporters of goods and
services sold electronically. If the level of trade and
income flows between capital-exporting and capital-
importing countries are relatively even, the conse-
quences of such an approach would be minimal as each
country could recover any lost revenue from its resi-
dents.41 Currently, capital-exporting countries are
mainly developed countries, while capital-importing
countries are more often than not developing coun-
tries.42 Flows of income between developed countries
tend to be more or less balanced, while those between
developed and developing countries tend to be unbal-
anced in favour of developed countries.43 On this basis,
moving to a residence-based system should have a mini-
mal tax impact as between developed countries,44 but
such a move could impact substantially on the division
of tax revenues between developed and developing
countries.45
In an electronic commerce context, capital-exporting
developed countries (including especially the United
States) currently lead the world in the production and
current residency definitions and taxation rules may be appropriate”. In 
2001, the OECD released a discussion document regarding the place of 
effective management rule; see OECD, The Impact of the Communications
Revolution on the Application of “Place of Effective Management” as a 
Tie-Breaker Rule (February 2001), available at www.oecd.org/daf/fa/e_com/
ec_4_POEM_Eng.pdf.
39. A 1999 decision of India’s Authority for Advance Rulings is a striking
example of the double taxation possibilities that could arise if countries took
unilateral measures to preserve their taxing rights. This decision suggested
that if source countries perceive that they are not sharing in the tax base gen-
erated by electronic commerce, they may take creative measures to tax pay-
ments which they believe erode their tax base; Doernberg, Richard L., “Inter-
national Tax Issues: The Taxation of Business Profits”, paper presented at the
International Fiscal Association Asia Regional Conference on E-Commerce
and International Taxation (Mumbai, India, November 2000).
40. See McLure, supra note 31, at 325-326: “Capital-exporting countries
support residence-based taxation because they want to keep the revenue gen-
erated by the foreign investment of their residents .... Capital-importing
countries favour relatively high source-based taxes on repatriated income for
which capital-exporting countries provide foreign tax credits.”
41. OECD Turku Discussion Document, supra note 24, at [92]: “Where
flows of income from business, investment, etc. are balanced between two
countries, it often does not make a large difference to the direction of revenue
collections if each country agrees to significantly curtail its source jurisdic-
tion to tax on a reciprocal basis as its residence taxation of income sourced in
the other country is correspondingly increased.”
42. See Dagan, Tsilly, “The Tax Treaties Myth”, 32 International Law and Poli-
tics 939 (2000), at 989: “Developing countries are, more often than not, capital
importers. Their outbound investments are typically insignificant in compar-
ison to the amounts of inbound investments they receive.” See also Mitchell,
supra note 18, at 227, observing that developed countries generally tend to be
net exporters of capital, goods and services, while developing countries tend
to be net importers of capital, goods and services; and Sweet, supra note 8, at
1996. While it is accepted that the relative positions of developed and devel-
oping countries as either capital exporters or capital importers may change
over time, the assertions made in this article are in the context of the prevail-
ing economic situation.
43. See Owens, Jeffrey, “The Tax Man Cometh to Cyberspace”, 14 Tax Notes
International 1833 (1997), observing that flows of income between developed
countries tend to be balanced. For the position of developed countries, see
also Miyake, Maiko and Magdolna Sass, “Recent Trends in Foreign Direct
Investment”, 76 Financial Market Trends 23 (2000), at 24, a review indicating
that, of the 29 OECD Member countries at the time of this study (1999), 13
had net direct investment inflows – i.e. Australia, Austria, Canada, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Korea (Rep.), Norway, Poland, Sweden,
Turkey and the United States.
44. See Dagan, supra note 42, at 990 (footnote 111): “The OECD [Model is]
designed primarily for treaties between countries where the flows of income
are roughly reciprocal ... when investment flows are more or less reciprocal,
the revenue sacrifices more or less offset each other.” See also McLure, supra
note 31, at 327: “The OECD convention primarily concerns fiscal relations
between developed countries. Because capital flows among developed coun-
tries can be expected to be roughly in balance over the long run, the distinc-
tion between capital-importing and capital-exporting countries may have lit-
tle significance.”
45. See Dagan, supra note 42, at 990 (footnote 11): “In a treaty between a
developed and a developing country the flows are largely in one direction:
income flows from the developing country to the developed country.” See also
Avi-Yonah, supra note 17, at 1313, observing that an objection to pure resi-
dence-based taxation is “that it results in more revenue being collected by
developed countries and less by developing countries”. See further Forst,
David L., “The Continuing Vitality of Source-Based Taxation in the Electronic
Age”, 15 Tax Notes International 1455 (1997), at 1472: “[U]nder a residence-
based taxing regime, the treasuries of the capital exporting countries grow
richer ... [while] the treasuries of the capital importing countries remain poor
since these countries [cannot] collect tax revenue from foreign investment.”
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export of goods and services sold electronically.46 These
countries would be the greatest beneficiaries of an exclu-
sive residence-based tax system, and this perhaps
explains why they prefer residence-based taxation.
However, the imbalance in revenue-sharing that would
exist between source and residence countries under an
exclusive residence-based approach, combined with the
propensity of countries to tax non-residents, will make
reaching an international consensus on this approach
difficult.47 While net exporters of goods and services
sold electronically will try to strengthen the residence
rules, net importers will, one way or another, claim what
they perceive to be their share of income from electronic
commerce transactions. This may ultimately lead to
double taxation as both source and residence countries
try to preserve their tax base.
2.5.3. Risk of capital flight
If an exclusive residence-based tax system is adopted,
then, apart from altering the present allocation of rev-
enues between residence and source countries, at a wider
level it could lead to an erosion of the worldwide tax
base because residence-based taxation increases the risk
of capital flight to low-tax jurisdictions.48 Capital flight
refers to the decision of resident taxpayers to invest
abroad rather than domestically because of the possibil-
ity of low (or nil) taxation in the offshore jurisdiction. If
corporations establish themselves in a tax haven or low-
tax country with a view to carrying on their electronic
commerce activities there, an effective residence-based
tax system would need to be implemented using anti-
deferral rules, such as controlled foreign company
(CFC) legislation. Theoretically, this should provide a
solution to the problem of capital flight, but the exis-
tence of these rules is not universal,49 and even countries
with CFC rules will encounter some problems with try-
ing to apply them in an electronic commerce context.
CFC rules are typically complicated to apply and diffi-
cult to enforce in a traditional context, and it can only be
expected that these difficulties will be accentuated in an
electronic commerce setting. For example, the effective
application of CFC rules depends on being able to
obtain the information necessary to enforce residence-
based taxes, but in an increasingly globalized world,
obtaining this information is increasingly difficult, mak-
ing the administration of a residence-based system very
difficult as a practical matter.50 Moreover, there may be
enforcement problems in an electronic commerce envi-
ronment because of the difficulty in verifying the iden-
tity of taxpayers to whom foreign income accrues and
ascertaining the amount of that income.
Apart from the administrative difficulties in applying
CFC rules in an electronic commerce setting, there are
substantive problems that are likely to be encountered
when applying such rules.51 For example, many CFC
regimes (e.g. the UK CFC legislation) contain an “exempt
activities test”, which is satisfied if a business is estab-
lished in a particular country and is managed and con-
trolled there and if its activities are of a trading nature. It
will be easier to satisfy this type of test in an electronic
commerce environment than in a traditional setting,
where establishing a business in a particular country
entails greater effort and expense.52 If such a business is
established in a low-tax jurisdiction (e.g. Bermuda or
Jersey) and is centrally controlled and managed there
(which may be possible through the use of e-mail and
videoconferencing technologies as well as intranets), the
CFC rules may be circumvented, but the business would
still be able to access world markets effectively from its
electronic presence in the low-tax country. If the CFC
rules do not prove effective in combating capital flight,
an erosion of the worldwide tax base could result, which
would be an undesirable outcome for all countries.53
46. See e.g. OECD, The Economic and Social Impact of Electronic Commerce:
Preliminary Findings and Research Agenda (1999), at 34, indicating that the US
currently accounts for approximately 80% of the global total in electronic
commerce; and Forst, supra note 45, at 1472, observing that the US accounts
for about 90% of the world’s commercial web sites.
47. See McLure, Jr., Charles E., “Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Eco-
nomic Objectives, Technological Constraints, and Tax Laws”, 52 Tax Law
Review 269 (1997), at 361-362: “[A] wholesale move to residence-based taxa-
tion would entail radical shifts in the international distribution of tax rev-
enues, especially from [developing countries] to developed countries. Many
would not think this fair and it will not be popular in many countries.”
48. See e.g. Avi-Yonah, supra note 17, at 1336: “[E]ven developed countries
find it hard to effectively enforce residence-based taxation on the global
income of individuals, especially from tax havens, and developing countries
find this task impossible.”
49. A 1996 OECD report on CFC legislation showed that 14 OECD Mem-
ber countries had CFC legislation; see OECD, Controlled Foreign Company
Legislation, Studies in Foreign Source Income (1996). Korea (Rep.) and Mexico
enacted CFC legislation in 1997, bringing the total number of countries with
CFC rules to 16; this number now appears to be closer to 21, with more coun-
tries (e.g. Venezuela) expected to enact CFC legislation; see Sandler, Daniel,
Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation: Pushing the Bound-
aries (2nd ed., 1998); and “Venezuela Moves Closer to Major Income Tax
Reform”, (1999) Worldwide Tax Daily, at 205-H.
50. It is outside the scope of this article to examine tax administration issues
in detail, but for present purposes, the difficulty of obtaining information
could be due to the encryption of electronic information as well as to the
problem of locating and tracing information transmitted on electronic net-
works.
51. In addition to the difficult tax administration issues associated with
enforcing CFC assessments, many commentators have expressed concerns
that CFC rules will be easily circumvented in an electronic commerce setting;
see e.g. Morgan, John et al., “Don’t Be Afraid of the Internet”, (1997) Interna-
tional Tax Review 19, at 20: “[C]ompanies are gaining access to worldwide
markets without the need for a local sales force and/or distribution networks.
They can therefore choose to locate content or other income generating rights
in a particular territory, thereby effectively choosing where their income will
be taxed. It is this increased flexibility in deciding where to locate an entity
and from where to make sales that could lead to significant planning oppor-
tunities ... controlled foreign company ... or Subpart F provisions will also
need to be considered. However, it should be possible to structure operations
to circumvent this legislation.” See also Lambooij, Machiel, “Rethinking 
Corporate Residence” (speech on 6 June 1997), available at
www.lovotax.nl/lovotax/tax/document.html?doc_id=175>: “New businesses
... do not need to be physically located where their customers are domiciled ....
A sales and distribution company can be set up in a convenient low tax loca-
tion. Assuming the effective management of this company is really located
there, in the absence of new source rules ... there is little tax authorities can do
to tax these profits.” See further Deloitte & Touche LLP and Information Tech-
nology Association of America, Taxation of Cyberspace (2nd ed., 1998), at 368,
noting that if CFCs can engage in extensive commerce in information and
services through web sites or computer networks located in a tax haven, it may
become increasingly difficult to enforce CFC rules.
52. Such businesses can be established completely online; see e.g. “Offshore
Information Services”, available at www.offshore.com.ai/, offering many ser-
vices, including establishing a virtual offshore presence in a jurisdiction such
as Anguilla. 
53. Other CFC regimes (e.g. the US Subpart F rules) are similarly challenged
by electronic commerce. These regimes depend on how income is character-
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Given these present difficulties, companies certainly
have an incentive to base their operations in low-tax
jurisdictions, including tax havens. The likelihood of
this occurring can also be explained by other develop-
ments. As electronic commerce grows, it is likely that
capital mobility will increase substantially, thereby cre-
ating an even greater risk of capital flight than presently
exists.54 Prior to the advent of electronic commerce,
access to foreign companies in low-tax jurisdictions was
limited for most taxpayers.55 Now, however, access to for-
eign companies and offshore banking facilities is more
widely available to anyone via the Internet.56
Many argue that businesses will be unwilling to establish
their business operations offshore due to security, tech-
nological and financial constraints. This is not a credible
argument. Even before the advent of electronic com-
merce, businesses were sensitive to establishing them-
selves in other countries in direct response to more
favourable corporate laws,57 and especially in response
to more favourable tax laws.58 A good example is the
response of businesses to the residence-based taxation
of shipping activities.59 Prof. Avi-Yonah has observed
that most of the income in these cases is earned by ships
registered in tax havens.60
Regarding electronic commerce, the Australian Taxation
Office reported that, in 1997, there were more than 
60 racecourse sites, 300 casino sites, up to 200
bingo/keno/lotto sites, and a dozen virtual casinos, oper-
ating mainly in the Caribbean.61 As electronic commerce
develops, these trends can only be expected to increase
significantly; this is supported by a recent report on the
growth of business presences in low-tax jurisdictions.62
In light of the above analysis, in an electronic commerce
environment under an exclusive residence-based tax
system, the risk of capital flight is likely to increase. If
this occurs, countries with CFC regimes will have to rely
increasingly on them to enforce residence-based taxa-
tion, but if such rules prove ineffective, an erosion of the
worldwide tax base could occur.
Therefore, any move to an exclusive residence-based tax
system should be preceded by a comprehensive review
of CFC rules. This would be necessary to ensure that the
rules remain relevant in an electronic commerce context
to guard against capital flight to low-tax jurisdictions.
2.6. Summary
While there are advantages to an exclusive residence-
based system, the disadvantages of such a system which
were analysed above must be overcome in order for it to
become a reality. Specifically, the risk of capital flight,
combined with the potential unfairness to countries that
are net importers of goods and services sold electroni-
cally, means that it is unlikely that many countries would
support a pure residence-based approach. Therefore, the
required international consensus would not be present
to enable the successful implementation of such a sys-
tem. In addition, the difficulties of finding an interna-
tionally acceptable and rigorous test for corporate resi-
dence represent a further obstacle to the adoption of an
exclusive residence-based tax system for electronic com-
merce transactions. Until all of these obstacles are over-
come, such a system is unlikely to provide a feasible and
internationally acceptable solution to accommodate the
taxation of electronic commerce transactions.
ized. For example, if income is characterized as a royalty or licence fee chan-
nelling it through a foreign sales company located in a low-tax country would
be ineffective due to the Subpart F rules. However, as electronic commerce
enables businesses to deal directly with consumers, income that previously
may have been characterized as passive income (e.g. royalties) may now be
considered as active income (i.e. business profits), which would not be subject
to the Subpart F rules. See e.g. US Treasury, Office of Tax Policy, The Deferral
of Income Earned Through US Controlled Foreign Corporations (2000), recog-
nizing that electronic commerce threatens the effectiveness of CFC rules. See
also Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “The U.S. Treasury’s Subpart F Report: Plus Ça
Change, Plus C’est la Même Chose?”, 55 Bulletin for International Fiscal Docu-
mentation 5 (2001), at 185.
54. See Owens, supra note 43, at 1833. See also Owens, Jeffrey, “Emerging
Issues in Tax Reform: The Perspective of an International Bureaucrat”, 15 Tax
Notes International 2035 (1997), at 2042, observing that the “most troubling
problem for tax reformers today is the decreasing ability of individual govern-
ments to sustain taxes on capital income”.
55. Apart from the prohibitive costs of establishing an offshore company,
the costs of transporting, insuring and storing tangible goods would make
such operations viable only for MNEs.
56. See e.g. “Offshore Information Services”, supra note 52, offering compre-
hensive services to establish a virtual business presence offshore.
57. See e.g. Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 527, referring to the massive shifting
of the formal residence of companies to New Jersey and then to Delaware as
these US states adopted favourable corporate laws.
58. Diane Ring used the example of the mutual fund industry in the United
States to illustrate how attentive businesses are to lower tax rates and how pre-
pared they are to be mobile in order to take advantage of the lower rates. In the
United States, the mutual fund industry, which is substantially based in Mas-
sachusetts, sought significant tax concessions from that state. The companies
asserted that they were a portable industry and were ready to move to take
advantage of recent tax laws in several other states that were designed to
attract the mutual fund industry away from Massachusetts. In response, Mas-
sachusetts made several tax concessions to keep the industry there. Ring,
Diane M., “Exploring the Challenges of Electronic Commerce Taxation
Through the Experience of Financial Instruments”, 51 Tax Law Review 663
(1996), at 667, arguing further that such examples can easily be seen to be
translated to the global arena. The literature alludes to other similar possibili-
ties; see e.g. Pilkington, Catherine and Sue Farron, “International Direct Taxa-
tion of E-Commerce: Developing a New Conceptual Model from Marketing
Principles”, paper presented at the 10th Tax Research Network Conference
(Birmingham, UK, September 2000), at 5: “[T]he capabilities of the technol-
ogy of the Internet could enable an ultimate shift of tax bases to tax havens.”
See also Hinnekens, Luc, “New Age International Taxation in the Digital
Economy of the Global Society”, 25(4) Intertax 116 (1997), at 117: “The new
digital technology ... widens the scope of international tax planning and tax
avoidance. The process also breeds the tax competitiveness of individual
States on those international markets. But fiscal competition to the detriment
of other countries and beggar-thy-neighbour tax policies are hardly the
answer. The State’s tax base becomes even further eroded (‘race to the bot-
tom’).” For more recent examples of similar concerns, see e.g. Kormendy, Peter
and Allesandra Fabro, “Hardie Leads the Way in Tax Shift Offshore”, The Aus-
tralian Financial Review (Sydney), 25 July 2001, available at afr.com/
companies/2001/07/25/FFXWSAAKIPC.html.
59. This example is especially relevant to electronic commerce transactions
as Art. 8 of the OECD Model, which taxes air transport and shipping profits
on a residence basis, may provide an analogue for adopting such a rule to
accommodate electronic commerce transactions.
60. Avi-Yonah, supra note 17, at 530, citing Loree, Philip J., “Shipping Feder-
ation Chairman Testifies on Competitiveness”, 91 TNI 39-26, 12 September
1991 (on LEXIS).
61. Richardson, Colin L. and Peter B. White, “Electronic Commerce and the
Australian Taxation System: An Exploratory Study of Six Industries”, in Aus-
tralian Taxation Office, Electronic Commerce Project Team, Tax and the Inter-
net – Volume 2 (1997), at 18.
62. The Wall Street Journal recently reported on the growing boom of dot-
com companies in Bermuda as companies set up shop in low-tax jurisdictions
to enjoy tax advantages over their competitors: see “Dot-Coms Go Offshore”,
available at interactive.wsj.com/articles/SB978914055626662536.htm.
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3. Exclusive Source-Based Taxation
3.1. Introductory remarks
The source principle of taxation (sometimes referred to
as the “territorial approach or principle”) entitles a coun-
try to tax income originating within its borders.63 One
explanation for the rationale of this principle is that it is
the source country, as the “place of income-generating
activity”,64 rather than the country in which the income-
producer resides (i.e. residence country) that economi-
cally contributes to the production of income; therefore,
the source country should be compensated for its con-
tribution.
Electronic commerce, it is widely believed, is putting
pressure on the source principle, and proponents of this
view therefore argue that residence-based taxation will
eclipse source-based taxation.65 The merits and prob-
lems associated with adopting a residence-based tax sys-
tem were analysed earlier, and it was observed that elec-
tronic commerce presents many challenges to such a
system.66 In light of these problems and despite the claim
that determining the source of income in an electronic
commerce setting will be problematic,67 a source-based
tax system may provide a viable solution to accommo-
date electronic commerce transactions. This proposition
is analysed below.
3.2. Implementation
An exclusive source-based tax system that applies to
electronic commerce transactions may be implemented
in two main ways. First, the business profits rule in Art. 7
of the OECD Model could be modified to specify that
the income arising from electronic commerce transac-
tions may be taxed only in the source country. This way,
such a system could be implemented within the existing
tax treaty network and could be adopted on an interna-
tional basis by countries that follow the OECD Model in
their treaty negotiations.
Alternatively, a new article could be added to the OECD
Model which deals specifically with the profits arising
from electronic commerce transactions and allocates
exclusive taxing rights with respect to such profits to the
source country. Such an article could be modelled on
Art. 17 of the OECD Model, which permits the source
country to tax the income derived by artistes and sports-
men in that country, despite the absence of a permanent
establishment there.68 This rule ensures that a source
country can levy tax on the typically significant amounts
of money that performers and artistes generate from
performances in that country. Similarly, a new provision
for electronic commerce transactions could allocate the
profits arising from these transactions to the customer’s
country, despite the absence of a permanent establish-
ment.
Prof. Vogel observed that one of the main reasons for the
source-based rule in Art. 17 of the OECD Model was the
recognition that the residence country of an artiste or
sportsman would often find it difficult to keep track of a
performer’s income due to “[his] mobility and to the
numerous different income-earning opportunities
available to [him]”.69 The residence country would also
be dependent on the various source countries for infor-
mation regarding the income earned by the artiste or
sportsman. Similarly, given the mobility that electronic
commerce offers, as well as the numerous markets that
may be accessed by an electronic commerce trader, a
source-based system modelled on Art. 17 may respond
to some of the concerns associated with collecting tax
with respect to electronic commerce transactions.
Art. 17 of the OECD Model could therefore be used as
an analogue for an exclusive source-based tax system to
accommodate electronic commerce transactions. If a
source-based tax system modelled on Art. 17 could be
introduced for electronic commerce transactions, con-
sideration should be given to the relative merits and
problems of introducing such a system. The remainder
of this article analyses the arguments for and against
adopting a source-based tax system.
3.3. Arguments in favour of an exclusive source-based 
tax system
In a traditional context, the prospect of adopting a tax
system based exclusively on the source principle has
been comprehensively reviewed by Prof. Vogel.70 He
argued that considerations of efficiency and equity, as a
rule, support exclusive taxation in the source country.71
63. Prof. Musgrave argued that, according to the doctrine of entitlement,
source countries should be entitled to tax income originating within their
borders since the countries in which consumers reside provide services that
are complementary to the consumption of their residents; Musgrave, Peggy B.,
“Interjurisdictional Coordination of Taxes on Capital Income”, in Cnossen,
Sijbren (ed.), Tax Coordination in the European Community (1987), at 198;
Musgrave, Peggy B., “Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax Base”, in
McLure, Jr., Charles E. (ed.), The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in World-
wide Unitary Combination (1984), at 230. 
64. Musgrave, R. and P. Musgrave, “Inter-Nation Equity”, in Modern Fiscal
Issues: Essays in Honor of Carl S. Shoup (1972), at 71, cited in Doernberg and
Hinnekens, supra note 10, at 306 (footnote 641).
65. See e.g. Forst, supra note 45, at 1455, observing that the US Treasury
believes that, with respect to electronic commerce, residence-based taxation
will likely be more prominent than source-based taxation: “Transactions in
cyberspace will likely accelerate the current trend to de-emphasize traditional
concepts of source-based taxation, increasing the importance of residence-
based taxation.”
66. For example, it was seen that determining the place of central manage-
ment and control and effective management, in circumstances where deci-
sions may be made by many directors in different countries through video-
conferencing technologies, would be problematic in an electronic commerce
context. See also Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 14, arguing that residence is
meaningless for MNEs and therefore source-based taxation is preferable to
residence-based taxation; and Australian Taxation Office, Electronic Com-
merce Project Team, Tax and the Internet – Volume 1 (1997), at 62, arguing that
residence-based approaches may not be an automatic solution to the prob-
lems created by electronic commerce as the source and residence principles
are equally at risk in an electronic commerce environment. For other prob-
lems with a residence-based tax system, see 2.5.
67. See e.g. US Treasury Report, supra note 5, at [7.1.5], quoted in 2.1.
68. Art. 17 therefore operates as an exception to the rules in Art. 7 of the
OECD Model; see Para. 1 of the Commentary on Art. 17 of the OECD Model. 
69. Vogel, supra note 13, at 971.
70. Vogel, Klaus, “Worldwide vs. source taxation of income – A review and
re-evaluation of arguments”, in three parts: Part 1, Intertax 216 (No. 8/9, 1988);
Part II, supra note 26; and Part III, Intertax 393 (No. 11, 1988).
71. Vogel, Part III, id. at 401, concluding that a general preference should be
given to a territorial system of taxation, in terms of both efficiency and equity
considerations.
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Some of these arguments deserve further discussion in
the context of electronic commerce transactions. This is
undertaken below.
3.3.1. Neutrality
Prof. Vogel argued strongly that the source principle
comports best with the neutrality principle, both in
terms of the dualism between capital-export neutrality
and capital-import neutrality and in terms of transac-
tion costs.
(a) Capital-export neutrality versus capital-import neu-
trality. Neutrality essentially requires that economic
processes not be affected by external influences such as
taxation. Capital-export neutrality and economic effi-
ciency were discussed above as an argument to advance
residence-based taxation (see 2.4.4.). According to the
argument, taxing worldwide income coupled with a for-
eign tax credit is thought to produce capital-export neu-
trality, whereas exempting foreign income is thought to
result in capital-import neutrality. As the principles of
import and export neutrality support the source and res-
idence principles, respectively, the issue becomes which
principle should prevail. In the earlier discussion, it was
observed that there has been a long-held view by econo-
mists (which is also reflected in the literature72) that only
capital-export neutrality is consistent with economic
efficiency, thereby implying a preference for residence-
based taxation.73
The long-held view has, however, been challenged and,
on the basis of these challenges (which suggest that cap-
ital-import neutrality should prevail), it may be argued
that source-based taxation should be preferred over res-
idence-based taxation. Otto Gandenberger, in a paper
presented in 1983, put forward three arguments con-
trary to what has been argued in favour of capital-export
neutrality.74 First, Gandenberger argued that, if a resi-
dence-based tax system is used and the tax rate in the
residence country is higher than the rate in the source
country, a smaller after-tax profit reduces an enterprise’s
chance to finance new investment in the source country.
The reason is that the enterprise has to anticipate a
higher overall tax burden than its competitors in a
lower-tax country (because of taxation in the residence
country), and it therefore may be influenced in its deci-
sion (made in the residence country) whether to invest
in the source country. This outcome is contrary to
achieving capital-export neutrality. Second, Ganden-
berger argued that the level of taxation in a country is
likely to correspond to the level of public goods pro-
vided, so that a country providing fewer public goods
often has a lower tax rate than one providing more pub-
lic goods. If this is true and if the source country has a
lower tax rate than the residence country, an enterprise’s
decision whether or not to invest in the lower-tax coun-
try may be affected since it would receive fewer public
goods in the lower-tax country than in the residence
country, but it would be subject to the residence coun-
try’s higher tax rate.75 Finally, Gandenberger showed
that, contrary to what has been written in favour of cap-
ital-export neutrality, source-country taxation is
adopted by many countries, particularly in cases of
deferral.76 Based on these arguments, Gandenberger
concluded that, contrary to the prevailing economic the-
ory, capital-import neutrality should be preferred over
capital-export neutrality, implying taxation in the source
country.
Other prominent economists, including Leif Mutén,
have argued the advantages of source-state taxation and
the disadvantages of a residence-based tax system, par-
ticularly for developing countries.77 Norman Ture
advanced the argument by redefining neutrality to mean
“that the taxation does not alter the (explicit or implicit)
relative prices of goods, services, activities, production
inputs, and so forth, in the private sector”.78 According to
him, this definition means that “neither country will
attempt to use its fiscal powers to change relative prices
in the other country, any more than it would in the
absence of taxes”.79 From this, Ture concluded that resi-
dence-based taxation distorts neutrality (as formulated
by him) and is therefore inconsistent with economic
efficiency. He also argued that only exclusive taxation in
the source country and exemption in the residence
country will yield a neutral outcome as only such a sys-
tem would leave the international flow of capital and
commerce unaffected.
(b) Transaction costs. Prof. Vogel argued that, in consid-
ering whether residence or source taxation is preferred
in terms of neutrality, a complete analysis should take
into account not only taxes, but also other state-induced
burdens and benefits.80 Most important among these
72. See the references cited in note 29, supra.
73. See e.g. Vogel, Klaus, “Taxation of Cross-Border Income, Harmonization,
and Tax Neutrality under European Law”, in Vogel, Klaus (ed.), Taxation of
Cross-Border Income, Harmonization, and Tax Neutrality under European Law
(1994), at 22: “According to an opinion which has been held for decades
almost exclusively among economists, only capital export neutrality comports
with the goal of economic efficiency, i.e. of allocating production factors in
such a way that productivity will be (Pareto-) optimal.”
74. See Vogel, Part II, supra note 26, at 312, citing Gandenberger, Otto, 
“Kapitalexportneutralität versus Kapitalimportneutralität. Allokative Über-
legungen zu einer Grundfrage der internationalen Besteuerung”, 7 Aufsätze
zur Wirtschaftspolitik (Mainz: Forschungsinstitut für Wirtschaftspolitik,
1983). What follows on this point has been adapted from this source.
75. In other words, an enterprise investing in a lower-tax source country
would pay a premium to do so as it would receive fewer public goods there
compared with those it would receive in its residence country, but it would
still be subject to the residence country’s higher tax rate.
76. See also Vogel, Part I, supra note 70, at 221, pointing out that Latin
America has traditionally emphasized source-based taxation in its income tax
laws; and at 222, observing that the International Chamber of Commerce
adopted a resolution in 1955 to the effect that source countries should have
the “sole right” to tax international income. Vogel also gave the example of the
International Fiscal Association, which in its 1961 and 1984 Congresses,
affirmed its support for source-based taxation.
77. Mutén, Leif, “Some Topical Issues Concerning International Double
Taxation”, in Cnossen, Sijbren (ed.), Comparative Tax Studies. Essays in Honor
of Richard Goode (1983), at 317. Thomas Horst and Sijbren Cnossen have like-
wise questioned the preference given to capital-export neutrality, claiming,
inter alia, that it restrains international investment; both cited in Vogel, supra
note 73, at 24.
78. See Vogel, supra note 73, at 24, citing Norman Ture.
79. Id.
80. Vogel, supra note 73, at 27: “An exclusive comparison of taxes levied by
different states ... is not meaningful on an abstract level because if the com-
parison disregards other state-imposed burdens, among which transaction
costs are the most important, what may be inferred from such reasoning 
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additional burdens are transaction costs.81 If they are
taken into account in determining economic efficiency,
it can be argued that capital-export neutrality (which
supports residence-based taxation) is an unattainable
ideal because a residence country cannot ensure that
investments, wherever made by its residents, are subject
to the same transaction costs in the foreign countries in
which the investments are made.82 By contrast, capital-
import neutrality (which supports source-based taxa-
tion) is attainable as foreigners would be subject to the
same transaction and production costs in the source
country as local enterprises and, if no additional bur-
dens are imposed by the residence country on the for-
eign investor, competition between local and foreign
enterprises in the source country is equal, unobstructed
and therefore neutral.83
(c) Summary. Whether the distinction between capital-
export and capital-import neutrality is accepted or
rejected, in light of the above analysis, it can argued that
the taxation of direct investments in source countries is
economically efficient only when the foreign investor
pays the same rate of tax and is subject to the same level
of transaction costs as local enterprises in the same
(source) country. This is consistent with source-based
taxation, and the reasons underlying this conclusion are
equally applicable with respect to electronic commerce
transactions.
3.3.2. Economic allegiance
The problems that electronic commerce is expected to
create are in many ways similar to the problems which
existed between capital-importing and capital-export-
ing countries in the 1920s and which led to the develop-
ment of the current international tax treaty system.
Before World War I, an international consensus on how
to divide international tax revenues did not exist, and it
was only after World War I that the double taxation of
income became a pressing problem.84
A compromise had to be found to balance the taxing
rights of the jurisdiction in which an enterprise was res-
ident (residence country) and the jurisdiction in which
the income arose (source country). Economic allegiance
was chosen as the guiding principle – eventually leading
to the concept of “permanent establishment”. The resi-
dence country had an unlimited right to tax unless the
enterprise had an economic allegiance to the source
country, in which case the source country could tax the
income attributable to such an allegiance. In determin-
ing economic allegiance, the location of a person’s true
economic interests had to be ascertained, and this was
defined as “the place where wealth is produced, that is,
the community of economic life which makes possible
the yield of the acquisition of the wealth”.85
Accepting that economic allegiance determines where
income is taxed, it is also necessary to analyse whether
the country of residence or source should have the pri-
macy to tax a person’s income. The early deliberations of
the League of Nations proposed an answer that
depended on the type of income, with business income
being primarily allocated to the source country,86 while
other types of income (e.g. dividends and interest) were
allocated to the residence country.87 Georg von Schanz,
to whom Prof. Vogel referred as one of the earliest advo-
cates of economic allegiance based on the location of
business and economic activities, recommended a divi-
sion of the tax base, but with the source country getting
a greater share than the residence country because of
Schanz’s assertion that economic allegiance to a source
country is greater than that to a residence country.88
Herbert Dorn also supported the assertion that the
source country should enjoy primacy of taxation under
the principle of economic allegiance, adding that the
pragmatic aspects of a source country’s ability to control,
determine and enforce taxation were important addi-
tional factors that support this assertion.89 Arthur Hard-
ing similarly argued for source-based taxation on the
ground that economic production resulted not just from
individuals, but from their interaction with and contri-
bution from the source country.90
cannot be of theoretical value nor of any practical use. The ceteris paribus
reservation cannot help here, for in this particular comparison ceteri are prac-
tically never pares.”
81. Id. at 26: “‘Classical’ literature on international income taxation ... impli-
citly presumed that between states only factor costs and taxes were different. It
is evident that this is far from reality ... not only those costs which are attribut-
able to the individual contract (or product) must be considered, but general
costs of transactions incurred by running the individual enterprise or by
making the investment overheads must be accounted for, too. It is practically
the total legal environment that determines transaction costs.” 
82. Id. at 27: “[The residence] state has no influence whatsoever on transac-
tion costs and on other state-induced costs incurred by the foreign invest-
ment.”
83. Prof. Vogel noted, however, that in order for a source-country tax system
to be truly neutral, both taxation and the aggregate of state-induced costs and
benefits must fall equally on investments by residents and foreigners. Id. at 28. 
84. Tax rates had risen to match rising government expenditures and
income tax systems were more widely adopted. Moreover, amendments to the
constitutions of countries, including the United States, provided for income
taxes to be levied on the worldwide income of a country’s citizens. In addition,
the post-war operation of several successor governments in areas that had
previously been subject to a single authority (e.g. trading operations) became
cross-frontier in character. In light of these developments, it became neces-
sary to find a way to overcome international double taxation.
85. Forst, supra note 45, at 1455. Economic allegiance was preferred over
political allegiance or citizenship because of the prevailing belief that in mod-
ern times – when capital and individuals are mobile – persons often have few,
if any, ties to their home country. By contrast, it was thought that the country
in which a person had an economic interest has the greatest right to tax
income.
86. This was the case in particular because the place where the income of a
business originated coincided with the location of the head office and the
jurisdiction in which business rights were enforceable.
87. See note 86, supra. This broadly corresponded with the prevailing inter-
national tax regime, where business profits are predominantly allocated to the
source country and passive income (e.g. dividends and interest) is allocated to
the residence country (although double taxation treaties frequently reduce or
eliminate the rates of source-country withholding taxes).
88. Vogel, Part I, supra note 70, at 219: “The state of residence to which the
taxpayer is connected ... should get its share, but it should get less than the
source state where income is produced .... Three-fourths of the income in
question should be taxed in the state of source, and one-fourth in the state of
residence.”
89. Id, at 220.
90. Id. at 221: “It appears that the State may tax all property, goods, labor,
services and the like, which have become identified with the economic struc-
ture of the State, by incorporation into or integration with the business mech-
anism so defined ... the right to tax then depends upon the fact that the eco-
nomic wealth is being used in the coordinated economic task of the social
group; that it is producing utility or wealth or service in connection with, as a
part of, and because of the economic solidarity of the social group.”
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Therefore, an analysis based on economic allegiance
supports taxation in the source country. Basing eco-
nomic allegiance on where activities occur makes sense
when world trade is physical – when international trade
consists principally of the physical shipment of tangible
goods or the physical movement of persons to perform
services at different locations; in this case, the source
country corresponds to the place where the operations
or activities giving rise to profits occur. Today, however,
world trade is less tangible as no physical presence in the
source country is needed to derive income. It can there-
fore be argued that economic allegiance is no longer a
valid principle to support the argument that income
should be taxed in the source country. In an electronic
commerce environment, the more stable basis for deter-
mining taxing rights may be to look to the location of
the individuals who make decisions or generate activi-
ties that give rise to profits, though this location is more
likely to coincide with residence countries than source
countries.91
Hence, while arguments based on economic allegiance
may strongly support source-based taxation in a tradi-
tional context, the declining relevance of economic alle-
giance in an electronic commerce context arguably mili-
tates against adopting a source-based tax system.
3.3.3. Equity considerations
Critics of residence-based taxation have argued that
such taxation may be unjust to a taxpayer who had to
earn income in other countries, possibly under adverse
conditions. Residence-based taxation may also be con-
sidered unjust as it disrupts the source country’s tax pol-
icy decisions.92
Vendors who sell products in other countries may there-
fore argue that it is more equitable to be taxed in the
source country at the same level as their competitors in
that country, particularly if the level of taxation in the
source country is lower than in the residence country. A
foreign vendor who utilizes another country’s facilities
(public goods) should arguably not be taxed more than
anyone else who, under the same circumstances, uses the
facilities to the same extent. This reasoning supports the
taxation of electronic commerce transactions in source
countries.
Taxation in source countries is also justified since tradi-
tionally it is the source country that has provided most
or all of the benefits relevant for production. At the same
time, however, a certain integration of the seller’s activi-
ties into the source country’s economy has been neces-
sary before the source country could tax the income
from such activities. This has usually been satisfied by
the existence of a permanent establishment. As elec-
tronic commerce allows vendors to sell products to con-
sumers in a source country without such integration or a
physical presence there, it calls into question the taxing
rights of a source country with respect to the income
arising from electronic commerce transactions. Prof.
Vogel argued, however, that even if such integration has
not occurred, taxation in the source state must be con-
sidered:
It cannot convincingly be denied that providing a market con-
tributes to the sales income at least to some extent as providing
the goods does. There is no valid objection, therefore, against a
claim of the sales state to tax part of the sales income.93
On this basis, source countries can assert their right to
tax the income derived from sales to their residents, as
this income would not have been derived but for the
market provided by the source country.94
3.3.4. Benefit theory
It can be argued that taxes are the price paid for all state
services by all taxpayers collectively and that countries
can therefore assert their right to tax based on the ser-
vices (benefits) provided. Schanz showed that both the
residence and source countries could assert a claim to
tax on this basis, but in his view, the source country’s
claim was greater than that of the residence country.95 In
this context, Prof. Vogel argued that, as it is usually the
source country that has provided most or all of the ben-
efits relevant for the production of income and therefore
incurred the costs of providing these benefits, exclusive
taxation should occur in the source country as compen-
sation to the government bearing these costs.96
In an electronic commerce setting, it is arguable whether
source countries provide most or all of the benefits rele-
vant for the production of income. From an economic
perspective, the only contributions of a source country
are often the customer base and the telecommunications
infrastructure to reach customers. It can therefore be
argued that source countries should not have any taxing
rights with respect to the income from electronic com-
merce transactions because all the income is created in
the residence country, with limited interaction with the
source country.
This conclusion can, however, be challenged on two
grounds. First, Prof. Arvid Skaar has provided support
91. See e.g. Magney, Tom, “Some Aspects of Source of Income (In the Last
Decade of the Twentieth Century)”, paper presented at the 5th National Tax
Retreat of the Taxation Institute of Australia, Queensland, 7-9 August 1997),
at 46: “[B]ehind all initiatings, negotiations and other activities leading to the
conclusion of a transaction there must be activities (including decision mak-
ing) by individuals (ie human beings) and it is where these individuals are
physically located when the relevant activities take place or decisions are
made which is of prime importance in determining the source of income.”
92. See e.g. Vogel, Part I, supra note 70, at 222, referring to the German legal
experts, Hans Flick, Klaus Tipke, Arno Schulze-Brachmann and Horst-Walter
Endriss, all of whom have defended this view.
93. Vogel, Part III, supra note 70, at 401.
94. This argument is especially strong in cases involving customized or
made-to-order products because such products would not have been made
without the market provided.
95. Vogel, Part I, supra note 70, at 219; and Vogel, Part III, supra note 70, at
395, noting that Schanz suggested that the source state should levy three
fourths of the tax that it would ordinarily levy on residents and that the resi-
dence state should levy one fourth of the tax it would ordinarily levy on the
domestic-source income of non-residents. 
96. Vogel, Part III, supra note 70, at 398. Some of the benefits traditionally
provided by source countries include “the provision of infrastructure or edu-
cation, as well as more specific government policies such as keeping the
exchange rate stable or interest rates low”; Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 520.
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for the view that, even if a business does not have a per-
manent establishment in the source country, it benefits
substantially from the source country‘s infrastructure
and should therefore make a contribution to the source
country. According to him:
The circumstance that short-term business operations may
accumulate substantial profits from domestic sources indicates
on the contrary that the taxpayer benefits substantially from the
infrastructure of the host country, even though no PE exists. It
seems that an enterprise which does not need to invest in
immovable facilities, or other fixed places of business, may still
derive considerable advantages from the community in which
its income sources are located. Today, the performance of a busi-
ness activity in another country, the duration of the activity and
the profits arising from it, are per se significant arguments ...
[that] requires all enterprises which obtain such benefits from a
country to render a corresponding contribution to this society,
whether or not they have a PE.97
Second, although residence-country companies might
claim that, because they have no physical presence in the
source country, they derive no benefits from any effec-
tive representation in the political process, source coun-
tries provide significant benefits to companies that carry
on business activities within them. These companies
benefit from the source country’s legal system inasmuch
as they rely on it to enforce payment for transactions, to
uphold intellectual property rights (e.g. trademarks) and
to maintain a stable and competitive business environ-
ment.98 The costs of providing all of these benefits fur-
ther justify the right of source countries to impose tax as
compensation for providing these benefits.
3.3.5. Desire of source countries to tax foreigners
In his writings on the work of the League of Nations,
Mitchell Carroll observed that taxation based on the
source principle is widely applied, reflecting the desire of
governments (particularly in developing countries) to
tax foreigners.99 Prof. Vogel similarly observed that “no
country which levies an income tax forgoes taxing
domestic source income, irrespective of who has derived
it”.100 As source countries typically have the first oppor-
tunity to collect tax on payments derived from within
their borders, it is, as a practical matter, difficult to pre-
vent them from taxing the payments.101 Therefore, even
if exclusive residence-based taxation is preferred, it is
unlikely to be followed in practice, especially in the case
of business income derived from large markets, where
the presence of substantial assets and/or intermediaries
of businesses has made source taxation enforceable.
In an electronic commerce environment, it can be
expected that source countries will also seek to tax the
payments made with respect to transactions arising
within their borders. Applying source-based taxation in
an electronic commerce context may be more difficult
than in a traditional setting due to the reduced need for
intermediaries and because businesses do not need to
maintain a substantial physical presence (and therefore
assets) in customer markets. While these factors will
make the practical enforcement of source taxation diffi-
cult, it is argued that source countries will nevertheless
persist in trying to tax these transactions, perhaps by
using intermediaries such as payment providers or
Internet service providers (ISPs) as the collection agents.
3.4. Arguments against an exclusive source-based tax
system
3.4.1. Revenue-sharing between source and residence
countries
In his writings regarding the League of Nations, Carroll
opined that, as less developed countries became more
industrialized, moves away from source-based tax prin-
ciples towards residence-based tax approaches could
occur.102 He also cautioned, however, that source-based
tax principles could not be applied where countries were
not economically balanced and in the case “of countries
whose relations were distinctly those of debtor and cred-
itor”.103 With respect to electronic commerce, as only a
few developed countries (chiefly the United States)
presently dominate the export of goods and services
provided electronically, adopting an exclusive residence-
based tax system would benefit primarily these coun-
tries to the detriment of countries that import such
goods and services.
If source countries are not given the opportunity to tax
the income arising from electronic commerce transac-
tions, this would create an imbalance between countries
that are net exporters of goods and services provided
97. Skaar, Arvid A., Permanent Establishment: Erosion of a Tax Treaty Princi-
ple (1991), at 559.
98. Other benefits provided by the source country include waste disposal
facilities for packaging materials, consumer protection laws, and an infra-
structure on which delivery vehicles can travel (in the case of physically deliv-
ered electronic commerce products).
99. Carroll, Mitchell B., Prevention of International Double Taxation and Fis-
cal Evasion (1939), at 17: “Governments are dominated by the desire to tax the
foreigner, or in other words ... taxes based on the idea of origin are ... still very
widely applied....”. See also Forst, supra note 45, at 1455, citing the League of
Nations: “A survey of the whole field of recent taxation shows how completely
the Governments are dominated by the desire to tax the foreigner. It seems to
be clearly instinctive that in laying down general principles to treat ‘origin’ as
of first importance and ‘residence’ as of secondary importance.”
100. Vogel, Part I, supra note 70, at 217.
101. Graetz, Michael J. and Michael M. O’Hear, “The ‘Original Intent’ of US
International Taxation”, 46 Duke Law Journal 1021 (1997), at 1037, quoting
Adams, Thomas S., “Interstate and International Double Taxation”, 22 National
Tax Association Proceedings 193 (1929), at 197: “Every state insists upon taxing
the non-resident alien who derives income from source [sic] within that
country, and rightly so, at least inevitably so.”
102. Carroll, supra note 99, at 15: “[T]he possibility of a development away
from earlier stages of economic thought typified by a strict adherence to the
principles of origin ... [may become possible] ... as semi-developed countries
become more industrialised, [and] with the resulting attenuation of the dis-
tinctions between debtor and creditor countries, the principles of personal
faculty at the place of personal residence will become more widely under-
stood and appreciated, and the disparity between the two principles will
become less obvious ....”
103. Id. at 17. See also Forst, supra note 45, at 1455, noting the observations of
a committee appointed by the League of Nations that “international agree-
ment on residence-based taxation is difficult because residence-based taxa-
tion creates an imbalance between wealthier, capital exporting countries and
poorer, capital importing countries. Under a residence-based taxing regime,
the treasuries of the capital exporting countries grow richer as their residents
make and earn income from foreign investments. On the other hand, the
treasuries of capital importing countries remain poor since these countries
cannot collect tax revenue from foreign investment”. The decision of India’s
Authority for Advance Rulings (see note 39, supra) clearly demonstrates that
source countries will act to preserve their tax base if they perceive that it is
being eroded.
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electronically and countries that are net importers of
such goods and services. This result would unfairly
favour developed countries (which are currently more
likely to export such goods and services) over develop-
ing countries, an outcome that would be not be accept-
able to source countries because it fails to share the tax
base between source and residence countries.104 More-
over, to the extent source countries perceive that they are
not properly able to share in the tax base generated by
electronic commerce, they can be expected to resort to
unilateral or creative measures to tax electronic com-
merce transactions.
3.4.2. Appropriate threshold for source taxation of
electronic commerce
A major obstacle to adopting a source-based tax system
to accommodate electronic commerce transactions is
that electronic commerce makes it possible for a busi-
ness to sell goods and services to persons in source
countries without a physical presence there. In these cir-
cumstances, source countries are not able to tax foreign
businesses under the currently accepted international
tax principles, including the permanent establishment
standard, as the physical presence requirements inherent
in this standard are not satisfied by foreign businesses
that sell goods and services electronically to persons in
source countries.
The volume of trade occurring through the physical
shipment of tangible goods or the physical movement of
persons to perform services at different locations is
decreasing. Thus, if source-based taxation is to remain
relevant, it will be necessary to find a new threshold that
does not depend on an economic allegiance based on
physical presence. There is support for this in the writ-
ings of Prof. Skaar, who observed that the permanent
establishment threshold has lost its force for new and
mobile industries, further noting that “an enterprise’s
connection to the soil is no longer a reliable evidence of
economic allegiance”.105 Therefore, if source-based taxa-
tion is to be adopted to accommodate electronic com-
merce transactions, for both substantive and practical
reasons, a new threshold not related to physical presence
will be needed on which to base the taxing rights of
source countries.
3.4.3. Collection and enforcement problems
Even if a source-based tax system were implemented for
electronic commerce transactions, it would be difficult
to collect and enforce source taxes because businesses
could operate without a physical presence or assets in
the source country.
Prof. Vogel posited that, in a traditional context, the
source-based rule in Art. 17 of the OECD Model is likely
to be more effective (and therefore more accurate) than
a residence-based approach in view of the potential dif-
ficulties faced by a residence country in ascertaining and
taxing the income of artistes and sportsmen earned in
other countries.106 This rule is an effective solution in a
traditional context as artistes and sportsmen usually act
through intermediaries (such as promoters or agents)
who operate as tax withholding agents. But seeking to
apply the rule in an electronic commerce context is
problematic because electronic commerce does not rely
on businesses maintaining a physical presence or other
representation in the source country which could oper-
ate as a tax withholding agent or as security for a tax lia-
bility. Further, to the extent electronic commerce facili-
tates trade without the need for human intermediaries,
residence countries enjoy a primacy of taxing rights as
goods and services sold electronically increasingly
become available from foreign jurisdictions.107
3.4.4. Characterization of income
Adding to the difficulties of implementing a source-
based tax system for electronic commerce transactions
are the difficulties of characterizing income as either
business profits or royalties. As this issue is beyond the
scope of this article, it is not analysed in detail, except to
briefly restate the problem created by electronic com-
merce. Under the OECD Model, the classification of
income as either royalties or business profits is not par-
ticularly important because the result is that the pay-
ment is taxable in the source country only if the income
is attributable to a permanent establishment there; oth-
erwise, the income is taxable only in the residence coun-
try. However, many OECD countries assert source-
country (withholding) taxing rights under Art. 12 of the
OECD Model; thus, for these countries, the distinction
between royalties and business profits is significant. The
income from most electronic commerce transactions
(involving both software and other digital products) is
classified as business profits rather than royalties, mean-
ing that the source country may not levy a withholding
tax on the income. This outcome further detracts from
implementing a source-based tax system for electronic
commerce transactions.
3.4.5. Disagreements regarding source
To effectively implement a source-based tax system,
there needs to be an international consensus regarding
104. It is probable that source countries would be unlikely to accept this out-
come and that they will act unilaterally to preserve their tax base if they per-
ceive that it is being eroded; this was demonstrated by the decision of India’s
Authority for Advance Rulings (see note 39, supra).
105. Skaar, supra note 97, at 573.
106. Vogel, supra note 13, at 971.
107. For example, purchasing books or airline tickets on a web site rather
than from a local bookseller or travel agent means that the intermediary
(middleman) is eliminated, resulting in a loss of revenue for the source coun-
try. The problem manifests itself particularly in high-value digital products,
such as software, that can be provided by large software companies over the
Internet. These sales may be effected by the head office (e.g. in the US) and are
not attributable to a permanent establishment in the residence country of the
customer who buys the software. There may be strong incentives to adopt
such a business model not only for cost reasons but also for tax reasons. For
example, a US software company may be motivated to adopt this model in
relation to sales to European customers who live in countries that have higher
tax rates than the US. In these cases, by not being taxed in the European
(source) countries, the US company avoids any excess credit provision that
may arise where the foreign tax rates exceed the US tax rates; see US Internal
Revenue Code Sec. 904, according to which an excess credit position arises
where the foreign income tax paid exceeds the allowable foreign tax credit
under Sec. 904.
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the determination of the source of income for electronic
commerce transactions. If a consensus cannot be
reached, the prospect of double taxation increases.108
In addition, to successfully implement a source-based
tax system for electronic commerce transactions, it will
be necessary to reach an international agreement on
how to apportion income among jurisdictions which
legitimately claim that the income is sourced in their
jurisdiction. Double taxation could result if two coun-
tries both view themselves as the source country with
respect to the same income, and an effective mechanism
to allocate taxing rights between competing claims will
need to be in place to ensure that income is subject to tax
in only one jurisdiction. Reaching a consensus on the
proper source of electronic commerce income will, how-
ever, not be an easy legal matter, and the ability to reach
a consensus is further complicated by political consider-
ations and competition between countries for taxing
rights with respect to the income generated by electronic
commerce.
3.5. Summary
The preceding discussion raises serious substantive and
practical doubts as to whether a source-based tax system
can successfully be implemented for electronic com-
merce transactions. At one extreme, source-based rules
may simply not be viable in an electronic commerce
environment. Even where these rules seem viable, other
challenges emerge, such as the need to reach an interna-
tional consensus on the source of electronic commerce
income. Failure to reach a consensus may result in dou-
ble taxation and also constitutes an impediment to inter-
national trade and the continued development of elec-
tronic commerce. Apart from the theoretical problems,
practical concerns emerge with applying source rules in
an electronic commerce context, including the difficul-
ties with collecting and enforcing source-based taxes
where the foreign vendor has no physical presence or
other representation in the source country.
This analysis therefore suggests that it will be necessary
either to consider new source rules or to revise the man-
ner in which the existing rules are applied. For example,
a new threshold that establishes economic allegiance by
economic presence rather than physical presence may
need to be considered in the context of applying the per-
manent establishment standard to electronic commerce
transactions. But concerns will also arise with this
approach as it may mean treating electronic commerce
transactions differently from traditional transactions,
thereby raising the possibility of violating the principle
of neutrality.
4. Conclusion
This article has examined the possibility of
adopting either an exclusive residence-based tax
system or an exclusive source-based tax system as
possible solutions for the taxation of electronic
commerce transactions. While not as extreme as the
polarized approaches of maintaining the existing
principles or introducing a new tax (e.g. a tax on
transmission or a “bit” tax), these approaches are
nevertheless predicated upon and proceed from
opposite philosophies. Both exclusive residence-
based taxation and exclusive source-based taxation
have strong theoretical justifications, but it does not
seem that either approach can be implemented
internationally. The inherently one-sided nature of
each approach makes it unlikely that an
international consensus will emerge on
fundamental changes of this kind in the foreseeable
future.
108. This article accepts that reaching such a consensus will not be easy.
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